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THE FUTILE FORGIVENESS: BASING DEPORTATION ON
AN EXPUNGED NARCOTICS CONVICTION
Deportation may work severe hardship, causing a complete break of
established social and economic ties. This fact has led to a doctrine of
judicial leniency towards aliens ordered to be deported; the deportation
statutes are to be strictly construed and all doubts as to their construction
are to be resolved in favor of the alien.' While recognizing the continuing
existence of this doctrine, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in GarciaGonzales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv.2 and Kelly v. Immigration & NaturalizationServ.3 recently upheld deportation orders based upon
state narcotics possession convictions, despite the fact that the aliens in4
volved had received the benefit of the California "expungement" statute.
That statute purports to release an offender who has successfully completed
a probationary period from the "penalties and disabilities of his conviction."
The alien in Kelly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., who had lived
in the United States for twelve years, was a first offender; he was convicted of illegal possession of marihuana. The Garcia-Gonzales alien was
a fifty-one year old woman, a resident of the United States for over forty
years, who was described by the court as a "self-respecting, self-supporting
member of the communities in which she has lived." 1 The decisions are
harsh under the circumstances. This Comment will discuss the question
whether the court was correct in its refusal to reverse the deportation
orders in light of the California expungement and consider whether
the present deportation statutes reflect sound policy judgment.
The federal statute upon which the deportations were based is section
241(a) (11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,6 which provides that "any alien in the United States . . . shall, upon the order of
the Attorney General, be deported who . . . at any time has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation [dealing with illegal
narcotics activities] . . . ."
Against their orders of deportation the

aliens Kelly and Garcia-Gonzales set up as a defense the expungement of
' Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948).

2344 F.2d 804 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3119 (U.S. Oct 11,
1965) (No. 389). Concerning the doctrine of judicial leniency, the court said "we
are aware . . . that matters of doubt should be resolved in favor of the alien in
deportation proceedings, because of the severity of the remedy invoked. (Fong Haw
Tan v. Phelan, . . .). Our duty, taking into account applicable rules of construction,
is to ascertain the intention of Congress." 344 F.2d at 810.
3349 F.2d 473 (9th Cir. 1965).
4 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4.
r)344 F.2d at 805.
666 Stat. 206 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (11) (1964).
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their convictions under section 1203.4 of the California Penal Code, which
provides:
Every defendant who has fulfilled the conditions of his probation for the entire period thereof, or who shall have been discharged from probation prior to the termination of the period
thereof, shall at any time thereafter be permitted by the court to
withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty; or if he
has been convicted after a plea of not guilty, the court shall set
aside the verdict of guilty; and in either case the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he has been
convicted. .

.

. provided, that in any subsequent prosecution of

such defendant for any other offense, such prior conviction may be
pleaded and proved and shall have the same effect as if probation
had not been granted or the accusation or information dismissed.
Dismissal of an accusation or information pursuant to this
section does not permit a person to own, possess or have in his
custody or control any firearm capable of being concealed upon
7
the person or prevent his conviction under Section 12021.
It is arguable that the expungement raises no question as to the propriety
of the aliens' deportation. The federal statute requires only a conviction,
and the expungement statute itself is intended to aid a defendant who "has
been convicted." On the other hand, the purpose of the state statute is to
eliminate the legacy of a criminal conviction when the defendant has served
a probationary period. Recognition of the conviction for purposes of
deportation would seem to defeat the express object of the statutory language. Since the deportation depends upon the state conviction, moreover, it is consistent to award equal recognition to a state procedure which
claims to eliminate, in a practical sense, the impact of that conviction. That
the state statute does not refer to deportation, which in any event is a
matter of plenary federal power, 8 does not foreclose a federal court from
giving effect to the expungement.
The first federal case to consider the relevance of an expungement
to immigration law was In re Ringnalda.9 It involved a petition for
naturalization which had been objected to on the grounds that the alien
7 CA.. PENAL CODE

§ 1203.4. (Emphasis added.)

Section 12021, referred to in

the expungement statute, says that aliens, drug addicts or convicted felons wvho own or
possess a firearm capable of being concealed on the person are guilty of a public
offense.

CAL. PENAL CoDE § 12021.

8 See United States ex rel. Zapp v. District Director of Immigration, 120 F.2d
762, 764 (2d Cir. 1941) ; United States ex rel. Trinler v. Carusi, 72 F. Supp. 193,
195 (E.D. Pa. 1947), rev'd on other grounds, 166 F.2d 457 (3d Cir.), vacated and
remanded for disnissal, 168 F.2d 1014 (3d Cir. 1948).
948 F. Supp. 975 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
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was not of good moral character as evidenced by his prior California conviction of negligent homicide.'
The alien had obtained an expungement
under section 1203.4. The court, overruling the objection, reasoned that
it "should not deprive an alien, otherwise worthy, of this privilege [of
naturalization] by attaching to one of his acts a disability which the
sovereign against whom he committed it has fully and entirely forgiven and
wiped out." 11 Following Ringnalda the Board of Immigration Appeals
seemed to accord expungements similar effect under the deportation statutes,12 which provided that a narcotics conviction, or two convictions of
13
crimes involving moral turpitude, were grounds for deportation.
But the Ringnalda court exaggerated the effect given the statute under
California law. Moreover, Ringnalda's view became increasingly inconsistent with actual practice as California decisions whittled down the effect of
section 1203.4. Ringnalda had depended heavily upon People v. Mackey,'4
where the California court stated that the expungement was intended to
"wipe out absolutely the entire proceeding in question in a given case and
to place the defendant in the position which he would have occupied in all
respects as a citizen if no accusation or information had ever been presented
against him." 15 Yet there already existed a few limitations upon the effect
of the statute. An expunged conviction could be pleaded in a later prosecution for another crime, 16 and could be used to impeach the defendant in a
subsequent prosecution. 1 Moreover the case of In re Phillips' 8 had held
that such a conviction could be used as the basis for disbarment of an
attorney. Ringnalda distinguished the Phillips decision on the ground that
10 Under § 307(a) of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1142, an alien applying
for naturalization had to show good moral character for the preceding five years of
residence.
".148 F. Supp. at 978. This statement is misleading if analyzed grammatically,
for it then says that the state has wiped out and forgiven a disability-the inability
to become naturalized-which is beyond the power of the state to wipe out and forgive. What it most likely means is that the state has forgiven and wiped out the act
insofar as state grounded legal consequences are concerned. For a conflicting conclusion,
see Holland, "Conviction" Defined, 40 J.S.B. CALIF. 36 (1965).
Holland argues
that in matters of immigration law the federal courts under the doctrine of Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), must look to state law in determining whether there
has been a conviction. Erie, however, was concerned with whether state law had
to be applied by a federal court and there is neither state deportation law nor state
power to make such law. Assuming that the fact of conviction has been established,
the question is whether this is the statutory "conviction" which is sufficient to bring
the deportation law into play. The statute being a federal one, the question is one of
federal law.
12 Matter of F-,
1 I. & N. Dec. 343, 348 (1942) (dictum).
'3 Immigration Act of 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. 889 (now Immigration and Nationality
Act §241(a) (11), 66 Stat. 204 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. §§1251(a)(4), (11)
(1964)).
14 58 Cal. App. 123, 208 Pac. 135 (Dist. Ct App. 1922).
15 Id. at 130, 208 Pac. at 138, quoted in 48 F. Supp. at 976.
16 People v. Barwick, 7 Cal. 2d 696, 699, 62 P.2d 590, 591 (1936).

17 People v. James, 40 Cal. App. 2d 740, 746-47, 105 P.2d 947, 951 (Dist. Ct
App. 1940) ; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4, quoted in text at note 7 mtpra.
Is 17 Cal. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941).
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the power to discipline officers of the court was constitutionally lodged in
the judiciary and could not be dealt with by the legislature. 19 This distinction vanished, however, when the Phillips case was extended to the
revocation of a physician's license in Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners.2° Noting an additional exception to the operation of the expungement statute in the case of a driver's license revocation, 2 1 the Meyer court
concluded that the Mackey statement equating an expungee with a person
against whom no information had ever been presented was incorrect.2 2 This
limiting trend continued, often with the subsequent imprimatur of the legislature, until an expungement no longer had any effect in the case of a
revocation of any of the various professional licenses.2s
Faced with these developments, the California courts sought a consistent explanation of the statute's effect. In Kelly v. Municipal Court 24
the court developed the theory that perhaps "section 1203.4 has reference
to criminal or quasi-criminal penalties, penalties imposed for punishment
or prevention of crime, such as imprisonment, fine, posting of a bond to
keep the peace, or registration and continuous and lifelong reregistration
[with the police] .

.

.

."

The court held the requirement that sex

offenders register upon a change of address to be one of the "criminal or
quasi-criminal" penalties which the statute was designed to eliminate.
People v. Taylor 26 applied the rule of Kelly v. Municipal Court to a
statute prohibiting one who had been convicted of a crime involving the
use of a deadly weapon from carrying a weapon capable of being concealed
upon the person. Taylor, however, was overruled by an amendment to
section 1203.4 itself.27 The amendment quite effectively limited the useful'OId. at 59-60, 109 P.2d at 347, discussed in 48 F. Supp. at 977 n.1.
20 34 Cal. 2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085, 2 STAN. L. REV. 221 (1949).
1 CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 309 (now CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13555),

2

discussed in Ellis

v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 51 Cal. App. 2d 753, 757-58, 125 P.2d 521, 524
(Dist. Ct. App. 1942).
22 Meyer v. Board of Medical Examiners, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 67, 206 P.2d 1085, 1088
(1949).
23The inroads into § 1203.4 are listed in Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 344 F.2d 804, 807-08 rL3 (9th Cir. 1965). This listing reads
in part:
The conviction also remains effective, despite the so-called expunging: for
impeachment of the offender as a witness, . . . for disbarment as an attorney, . . . for suspending a physician's license, . . . for proof in an action on
injuries arising out of the offense ." . . . There are also many statutory
exceptions in the stated effect of section 1203.4: CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 1679 (discipline of physicians) ; 2963 (discipline of licensed psychologists) ;
6102 (discipline of attorneys); 10,177 (discipline of licensed real estate
dealers) ; 10,032 (discipline of licensed business opportunity brokers) ; 10,562
(discipline of mineral, oil and gas licensees) ; CAL. VEHICLE CODE § 13,555
(revocation of motor vehicle drivers' licenses) ; CAL. EDUc. CODE §§ 12,910,
12,811 (discipline of teachers).
24 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 324 P.2d 990 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958).
25 Id. at 42, 324 P.2d at 992.
28178 Cal. App. 2d 472, 3 Cal. Rptr. 186 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
27 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1735, § 1, at 3744; see text at note 7 supra.
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ness of the reasoning in Kelly v. Municipal Court as to the "criminal"
nature of the particular penalty.
In view of this transition in California law, there remains no support
for Ringnalda'sassertion that under California law an expungement means
that a conviction has been "fully and entirely forgiven and wiped out."
Considered from this viewpoint only, then, the decisions in Garcia-Gonzales
and Kelly v. Immigration & NaturalizationServ. were correct. The policy
of deference to state law enunciated in Ringnalda, consistently applied, demands that the federal courts revise their assessment of an expungement
in accordance with that made by California herself.
Ringnalda, however, contained an additional ground upon which an
expungement could be given effect in deportation cases. This theory is
based upon the similarity between an expungement and a pardon. Discussing a person who had received an expungement, the Ringnalda court
said:
His position is not unlike that of a person pardoned.

A pardon

is "a purging of the offense. . . ." It "takes away poenam et
culpam". . ..
"A pardon reaches both the punishment pre-

scribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent
as if he had never committed the offense..
28
This Ringnalda dictum was adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals
for cases arising under the deportation statutes, 29 which then provided that
a deportation based upon a conviction of a crime does not take place if the
alien has received a pardon. 3 ° For purposes of deportation, then, the
pardon-expungement analogy is not only a matter of policy but also a matter
of statutory interpretation. If there is no significant difference between
an expungement and a pardon, there is no reason to treat them differently
under the federal statute. With the limitations that have been made upon
its effect, the expungement statute is indeed essentially similar to the
California pardon statute, which reads in part:
Whenever a person is granted a full and unconditional pardon
by the Governor, based upon a certificate of rehabilitation, the
28In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975, 976-77 (S.D. Cal. 1943).
29 Matter of E-

V- , 5 I. & N. Dec. 194, 195-96 (1953):
The provision in section 19(a) of the Immigration Act of 1917 regarding

pardons and recommendations against deportation has been substantially

incorporated in section 241(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
The effect of an expungement of a record of conviction under section 1203.4

of the Penal Code of California has been held to be equivalent to a pardon.

[T]he alien . . . has received the benefits of a pardon as evidenced by the
expungement of the record of conviction pursuant to section 1203.4 ....
See Matter of B-

, 7 I. & N. Dec. 166, 168 (1956).

30 Immigration Act of 1917, § 19, 39 Stat. 889; (repealed by Immigration and

Nationality Act of 1952, §241(b), 66 Stat. 208 (1952)).
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pardon shall entitle the person to exercise thereafter all civil and
political rights of citizenship, including but not limited to: (1) the
right to vote; (2) the right to own, possess, and keep any type
of firearm that may lawfully be owned and possessed by other
citizens; except that this right shall not be restored, and Section
12001 and 12021 of the Penal Code shall apply, if the person was
ever convicted of a felony involving the use of a dangerous
weaponYThe similarity of the two procedures is perhaps best shown in the following
comparison by the Taylor court of the pardon provision and the probation
procedure by which defendants become eligible for expungement.
Probation . . . is available

only to those defendants found

eligible by the proper authorities and by the court having jurisdiction. .

. [The pardon provisions] . . . deal only with par-

dons granted after a person has been convicted of a felony and
"released from the State prison or other State institution . ... "
It is to be assumed that such person was not eligible for probation
when first convicted: The pardon sections therefore provide an
alternative method by which convicted felons who have served
a prison term may be restored to some of the "civil and political"
32

rights of citizens.

There remains no practical distinction to be made between the two procedures. The requirement of registration by a sex offender is eliminated by
both,33 and neither has any effect so far as the prohibition against the
carrying of a concealable weapon by one convicted of a crime involving
a deadly weapon 3 4 Nor is there any important distinction to be made as
concerns the posture of an alien facing a deportation order. Since the
pardon requires a certificate of rehabilitation, a pardoned alien is in the
same position as the alien who has proved himself deserving of an expungement upon the termination of his probation period.
The similarity between an expungement and a pardon thus provides
a persuasive argument for treating the two procedures alike for the purposes of the deportation statute. Unfortunately, this conclusion supports
the correctness of the Garcia-Gonzalesand Kelly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv. cases, because Congress in 1956 amended the pardon clause
of the deportation statute to provide that it should not operate in the case
31 CAL. PEN,AL CODE § 4852.17. Section 12021, mentioned in the statute, is discussed at note 7 supra; § 12001 merely defines "weapons."
32 People v. Taylor, 178 Cal. App. 2d 472, 479-80, 3 Cal. Rptr. 186, 191 (1960).
3 Kelly v. Municipal Court, 160 Cal. App. 2d 38, 324 P.2d 990 (1958), discussed
in text accompanying notes 24-27 supra, eliminated the requirement for purposes of
the expungement; it is eliminated for purposes of a pardon by statute. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 290.5.
34 See text at notes 7, 31 supra.

378

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.114:372

of narcotics convictions.3 5 A consistent application of the pardon-expungement analogy, then, would indicate that an expungement should be given
no effect in the case of a narcotics violation.
The 1956 amendment was mentioned by the Garcia-Gonzalescourt,3 6
by reference to the Attorney General's decision in Matter of A_
F_,3
where it was said:
The history of § 241(a) (11) convinces me that Congress did
not intend that aliens convicted of narcotic violations should escape
deportation because, as in California, the State affords a procedure
authorizing a technical erasure of the conviction. Traffic in
narcotics has been a continuing and serious Federal concern.
Congress has progressively strengthened the deportation laws
dealing with aliens involved in such traffic. . . . [T] he deportation statute was amended to eliminate the requirement that . . .
there must be a sentence. At the same time the statute was extended to convictions for violation of State as well as Federal
statutes. And, since the 1956 amendment, an alien may no longer
escape deportability by proffering a pardon. In the face of this
clear national policy, I do not believe that the term "convicted"
may be regarded as flexible enough to permit an alien to take
advantage of a technical "expungent" [sic] . . ..
The Attorney General's decision, based on a strict congressional attitude
toward narcotics offenders, was facilitated by the weakness of the Ringnalda
doctrine. It is more persuasive, however, to realize at the outset that the
reasoning of the Ringnalda court is now quite inappropriate because of
changes in California law. By virtue of this, the pardon-expungement
analogy is isolated, where it can be dealt with effectively in the light of the
1956 amendment. This latter approach, moreover, answers more clearly
the dissent in Kelly v. Immigration & NaturalizationServ.P9 The dissent's
first argument, based upon statements by a California jurist 40 and California courts, 41 is that deportation should not occur in the face of an
3
5 Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(b), 66 Stat. 208 (1952), as amended,
8 U.S.C.
§ 1251(b) (1964).
36
Garcia-Gonzales v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 344 F2d 804, 809
(9th Cir. 1965).
37 8 I. & N. Dec. 429 (1959).
This was the reconsideration of the order of deportation affirmed in Arrellano-Flores v. Hoy, 262 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 921 (1960). Following the circuit court decision, the alien had
obtained an expungement of his conviction and thus argued that his standing before
the court, at which time he had not received an expungement, was sufficiently different
that his deportation order should be reconsidered. This position was basically sound,
since Arrellano-Floreshad actually held only that the prospect of an expungement
was ineffective against a deportation order.
38 8 I. & N. Dec. at 445-46.
39
4 0 349 F.2d at 474.
Holland, supra note 11, at 47, quoted in 349 F.2d at 477.
41
In re Trummer, 60 Cal. 2d 658, 660, 388 P.2d 177, 179, 36 Cal. Rptr. 281, 284
(1964); People v. Banks, 53 Cal. 2d 370, 386, 348 P.2d 102, 113 (1959), quoted in
Kelly v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 349 F.2d 473, 476-77 (9th Cir. 1965)
(dissenting opinion).

19661

DEPORTATION FOR EXPUNGED CONVICTION

expungement because an expungement restores a defendant to his civil
rights.42 But assuming freedom from deportation to be a civil right, the
expungement does no more for the alien than does a pardon, which "shall
entitle the person to exercise thereafter all civil and political rights of
citizenship .

...

43 It also answers the dissent's charge that the Kelly

v. Immigration & NaturalizationServ. and Garcia-Gonzalesdecisions result
in an inconsistent application of the deportation statute to narcotics cases,
on the one hand, and nonnarcotics cases on the other.4 4 The inconsistency
is shown to be a result of the statute itself and not its application.
The Garcia-Gonzalesand Kelly v. Immigration & NaturalizationServ.
decisions are harsh. However, employment of the judicial leniency
doctrine to reverse the deportation orders would clearly have contravened
the intended application of present deportation law. The remedy thus lies
with Congress.
It would appear preferable to return to the situation where a pardon
or expungement could prevent deportation in narcotics cases. While
narcotics control has become a serious federal problem, and there may be
reason to believe that aliens are responsible for part of the drug traffic, 45 it is
hard to view the deportation of aliens such as those involved in these cases
as an appropriate remedy. There seems to be no reason, moreover, for
specifically excluding such narcotics offenders from that group of aliens
as to whom a pardon or expungement may operate to prevent deportation.
The exercise by state officials of discretion to grant a pardon or expungement is equally strong evidence of rehabilitation in a narcotics case as in
other cases. Reasoning that narcotics use is a genre of criminality from
which convicts are rarely rehabilitated seems inconsistent with the retention
of the pardon clause in the case of the sex offender who, it is arguable,
is equally resistant to rehabilitative measures. 46 If the fear is that narcotics
violations are so likely to recur that an expungement or pardon in such cases
would mean little, or that state officials will be overly liberal in granting
such relief, provision can be made to limit the effect of expungements or
pardons to first offenses. This solution accepts a state determination that
an alien is no longer to be regarded as a criminal and dangerous to society.
If there is any basis to this state determination, the real reason for the
alien's being deemed deportable in the first place no longer exists.
42 Id. at 477.
43

44

See text at note 31 supra.
See 349 F.2d at 479-80 (dissenting opinion).

45 See S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1951); Hearings Before
Special Senate Committee To Investigate Organized Crime inInterstate Commerce,
82d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 14, at 344-48 (1951).
4666 Stat. 208 (1952), as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1964). The Board and
the Attorney General have indicated that the rule of the narcotics provision will not
be extended to the cases involving other convictions as ground for deportation. Matter
of G- , 9 I. & N. Dec. 159 (1960).

